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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of information theo-
retic secure communication when a source has private messages
to transmit to m destinations, in the presence of a passive
adversary who eavesdrops an unknown set of k edges. The
information theoretic secure capacity is derived over unit-edge
capacity separable networks, for the cases when k = 1 and m
is arbitrary, or m = 3 and k is arbitrary. This is achieved
by first showing that there exists a secure polynomial-time
code construction that matches an outer bound over two-layer
networks, followed by a deterministic mapping between two-layer
and arbitrary separable networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, a large portion of exchanged data over communica-
tion networks is inherently sensitive and private (e.g., banking,
professional, health). Moreover, given the recent progress in
quantum computing, we can no longer exclusively rely on
computational security: we need to explore unconditionally
(information theoretic) secure schemes. In this paper, we
present new results for information theoretic security over
networks with multiple unicast sessions.
We assume that a source has m private messages to send
to m destinations over a network modeled as a directed graph
with unit capacity edges. This communication occurs in the
presence of a passive external adversary who has unbounded
computational capabilities (e.g., quantum computer), but lim-
ited network presence, i.e., she can wiretap (an unknown set
of) at most k edges of her choice. We seek to characterize the
information theoretic secure capacity for this setup.
Our results apply to the class of separable networks that,
broadly speaking, are networks that can be partitioned into
a number of edge disjoint subnetworks that satisfy certain
properties (see Definition 3 in Section II). We establish a
direct mapping between the secure capacity for separable
networks, and the secure capacity for two-layer networks
constructed as follows. The source is connected to a set of
relays via direct edges. These relays are then connected to the
m destinations, such that each destination is directly connected
to an (arbitrary) subset of the relays. An example of such a
two-layer network with 6 relays and 3 destinations is shown
in Fig. 1.
In [1], we characterized the secure capacity region for
separable networks having m = 2 destinations. We showed
that for m = 2 it is optimal to use different parts of the
network to transmit the keys and the encoded messages.
However, as we also pointed out in [1], such a scheme is not
optimal when m > 2. We proved this by constructing a joint
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Fig. 1: Example of a two-layer network. For k = 1, the joint
scheme achieves the rate triple (2, 2, 1). This rate triple
cannot be achieved by spatially separating the transmissions
of the keys and the encoded messages.
scheme for two-layer networks that mixes the transmission
of keys and encoded messages over the network, and showing
that it can achieve higher secure rates than spatially separating
the transmissions of the keys and the encoded messages. For
instance in Fig. 1, the joint scheme achieves the rate triple
(2, 2, 1), which is not possible otherwise.
In this paper, we proved that we can leverage the
polynomial-time joint scheme in [1] for two-layer networks, to
prove capacity results for separable networks for the following
additional cases: (i) networks where m = 3 and k is arbitrary;
(ii) networks where k = 1 and m is arbitrary; (iii) networks
where k and m are arbitrary, but the network has some
special structure in terms of minimum cut. To prove optimality
in these new cases, we needed new proof techniques, that
include calculating the dimension of the sum of m = 3
subspaces in a form that matches a modified outer bound. We
also prove that the secure capacity region of any separable
network can be characterized from the secure capacity region
of the corresponding two-layer network, referred to as the child
two-layer network. In particular, we provide a deterministic
mapping from a secure scheme for the child two-layer network
to a secure scheme for the corresponding separable network.
We note that for m = 2 every network is separable [2];
however this is no longer the case for m ≥ 3 [1].
Related Work. Shannon [3] proved that the one-time pad can
provide perfect information theoretic security with pre-shared
keys. For degraded point-to-point channels, Wyner [4] showed
that information theoretic security can be achieved without
pre-shared keys. With feedback, Maurer [5] proved that secure
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communication is possible, even when the adversary has a
channel of better quality than the legitimate receiver. Multicast
traffic over networks of unit capacity edges was analyzed by
Cai et al. in [6], and followed by several other works, such
as [7], [8]. In [6], the information theoretic secure capacity was
characterized for networks where a source multicasts the same
information to a number of destinations in the presence of a
passive external adversary eavesdropping any k edges of her
choice. In [9], the authors studied adaptive and active attacks
and also considered multiple multicast traffic over a layered
network structure, with arbitrary number of layers. However,
different to this paper, every node in one layer is connected to
every node in the next layer. It therefore follows that, for the
case of two layers, our setting encompasses the one in [9].
Paper Organization. In Section II we define two-layer and
separable networks, and formulate the problem. In Section III,
we review the secure scheme proposed in [1] and in Sec-
tion IV, we characterize its achieved rate region. In Section IV
we also show the mapping between separable and two-layer
networks. In Section V and Section VI, we prove that the
scheme achieves the secure capacity when k = 1 and m = 3,
respectively. In Section VI, we also provide sufficient condi-
tions for the scheme to be optimal for arbitrary k and m.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation: Calligraphic letters indicate sets; ∅ is the empty set;
A1unionsqA2 indicates the disjoint union of A1 and A2; A1\A2 is
A1∩AC2 ; [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}; [x]+ := max{0, x} for x ∈ R.
A two-layer network consists of one source S that wishes
to communicate with m destinations, by hopping information
through one layer of t relays. As such, a two-layer network is
parameterized by: (i) the integer t, which denotes the number
of relays in the first layer; (ii) the integer m, which indicates
the number of destinations in the second layer; (iii) m sets
Mi, i ∈ [m], such that Mi ⊆ [t], where Mi contains the
indexes of the relays connected to destination Di. An example
of a two-layer network is shown in Fig. 1, for which t = 6,
m = 3,M1 = {1, 2, 4},M2 = {3, 4, 5, 6} andM3 = {2, 3}.
We represent a two-layer wireline network with a directed
acyclic graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes
and E is the set of edges. The edges represent orthogonal
and interference-free communication links, which are discrete
noiseless memoryless channels of unit capacity over a common
alphabet. If an edge e ∈ E connects a node i to a node j, we
denote, tail(e) = i and head(e) = j. I(v) and O(v) are the set
of all incoming and outgoing edges of node v, respectively.
Source S has a message Wi for destination Di, i ∈ [m].
These m messages are assumed to be independent. Thus, the
network consists of multiple unicast traffic, where m unicast
sessions take place simultaneously and share the network
resources. A passive external eavesdropper Eve is also present
and can wiretap any k edges of her choice. The symbol
transmitted over n channel uses on e ∈ E is denoted as Xne .
In addition, for Et ⊆ E we define XnEt = {Xne : e ∈ Et}. We
assume that S has infinite sources of randomness Θ, while the
other nodes in the network do not have any randomness.
Over this network, we seek to reliably communicate (with
zero error) the message Wi, i ∈ [m] to destination Di so that
Eve receives no information about the content of the messages.
In particular, we are interested in ensuring perfect information
theoretic secure communication, and we aim at characterizing
the secure capacity region, which is next formally defined.
Definition 1 (Secure Capacity Region). A rate m-tuple
(R1, R2, . . . , Rm) is said to be securely achievable if there
exist a block length n with Ri = 1nH(Wi), ∀i ∈ [m] and
encoding functions fe,∀e ∈ E , over a finite field Fq with
Xne =
{
fe
(
W[m],Θ
)
if tail(e) = S,
fe ({Xn` : ` ∈ I(tail(e))}) otherwise,
such that each destination Di can reliably decode the message
Wi i.e., H (Wi|{Xne : e ∈ I(Di)}) = 0, ∀i ∈ [m].
We also require perfect secrecy, i.e., I
(
W[m];X
n
EZ
)
=
0, ∀ EZ ⊆ E such that |EZ | ≤ k. The secure capacity region
is the closure of all such feasible rate m-tuples.
In order to prove that our designed scheme meets the perfect
secrecy requirement in Definition 1, we will use the “matrix
rank” condition on perfect secrecy proved in [10, Lemma 3.1].
We now provide a couple of definitions that will be used
in the remaining part of the paper, and we state two remarks
that highlight some properties of the networks of interest.
Definition 2 (Min-Cut). We denote by MA the capacity of
the min-cut between the source S and the set of destinations
DA := {Di, i ∈ A}, and refer to it as the min-cut capacity.
Definition 3 (Separable Graph). A graph G = (V, E) with a
source and m destinations is said to be separable if it can
be partitioned into 2m − 1 edge disjoint graphs (graphs with
empty edge sets are also allowed). In particular, these graphs
are denoted as G′J = (V, E ′J ),J ⊆ [m],J 6= ∅ and are such
that E ′J ⊆ E and E ′J ∩ E ′L = ∅, ∀J 6= L ⊆ [m]. Moreover,
their min-cut capacities satisfy the following condition
MA =
∑
J⊆[m]
J∩A6=∅
M ′J , ∀A ⊆ [m], (1)
where, for G, MA is defined in Definition 2, and the graph G′J
has the following min-cut capacities: (i) M ′J from the source
S to any non-empty subset of destinations in J , and (ii) zero
from the source S to the set of destinations {Di : i ∈ [m]\J }.
Remark 1. For two-layer networks, we have MA =
|∪i∈AMi|. For notational convenience, we let M∩{i,j} =
|Mi ∩Mj | and M∩{i,A} = |Mi ∩ (∪j∈AMj) |. Moreover,
we also assume that M{i} ≥ K,∀i ∈ [m] (otherwise secure
communication is not possible) with M∅ := K for consistency.
Remark 2. The single unicast secure capacity [6] is Ri =
M{i} − k, ∀i ∈ [m]. However, when multiple unicast sessions
share common network resources, in general, it is not possible
to communicate at rate Ri = M{i} − k, i ∈ [m] to all
destinations simultaneously (for any choice of k). This is also
highlighted in the outer bound that we derived in [2], which is
contained inside the region given by Ri = M{i}−k, ∀i ∈ [m].
III. SECURE TRANSMISSIONS SCHEME
We here review the secure transmission scheme for two-
layer networks that we recently proposed in [1]. The source
S encodes the message packets with k random packets and
transmits these packets on its outgoing edges to the t relays.
We can write the received symbols at the t relays as
 X1...
Xt
 =
 M | V


W1
...
Wm
K
 , (2)
where: (i) Wi, i ∈ [m] is a column vector of Ri message
packets for destination Di, (ii) K is a column vector which
contains the k random packets, (iii) M is a matrix of dimen-
sion t × (∑mi=1Ri), and (iv) V is a Vandermonde matrix of
dimension t×k. The matrix V is chosen to guarantee security
as per [10, Lemma 3.1]; hence, no matter which k edges Eve
wiretaps, she learns nothing about the messages W[m].
Each relay i ∈ [t] forwards the received symbol Xi in (2) to
the destinations it is connected. As such, each destination will
observe a subset of symbols from {X1, X2, . . . , Xt}. Finally,
destination Di, i ∈ [m] selects a decoding vector and performs
the inner product with [X1, X2, . . . , Xt]. This decoding vector
is chosen such that it has two characteristics: (1) it is in the
left null space of V , i.e., in the right null space of V T ; this
ensures that each destination is able to cancel out the random
packets (encoded with the message packets); (2) it has zeros in
the positions corresponding to the relays it is not connected to;
this ensures that each destination uses only the symbols that it
observes. In other words, all the decoding vectors that Di can
choose belong to the null space of the matrix Vi defined as
Vi =
[
V T
Ci
]
, (3)
where Ci is a matrix of dimension t¯ × t, with t¯ being the
number of relays to which Di is not connected to. In particular,
each row of Ci has all zeros except a one in the position
corresponding to a relay to which Di is not connected to. For
instance, with reference to the network in Fig. 1, we have
C1 =
0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 , C3 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
IV. ACHIEVED SECURE RATE REGION
In this section, we first derive the rate region achieved by
the secure scheme in Section III, and then present the mapping
between separable and two-layer networks. In particular, we
have the following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. The secure rate region achieved by the proposed
scheme is given by
0 ≤∑i∈ARi ≤ dim (∑i∈ANi) , ∀A ⊆ [m], (4)
where Ni is the right null space of the matrix Vi in (3).
A. Secure Scheme for any Separable Network
We will here first show that for any separable network, a
corresponding two-layer network can be created such that both
networks have the same min-cut capacities MA for all A ⊆
[m]. We will then show that a secure scheme designed for a
two-layer network can be converted to a secure scheme on the
corresponding separable network.
By Definition 3, a separable network G with m destinations,
can be separated into 2m − 1 networks G′J , J ⊆ [m],J 6= ∅
where G′J has min-cut capacity M ′J to every subset of
destinations in J . To construct the corresponding two-layer
network, we use the following iterative procedure: (1) we
place the source node S in layer 0 of our network, and the
m destination nodes Di, i ∈ [m], in layer 2 of our network;
(2) for each J ⊆ [m], we add M ′J relays in layer 1 of our
network; (3) for each J ⊆ [m], we connect: (i) the source in
layer 0 with all the added M ′J relays, and (ii) all the added M
′
J
relays with the destinations Di, i ∈ J in layer 2. By following
the above procedure, for each A ⊆ [m], the min-cut capacity
in the constructed two-layer network is MA as given in (1).
As such, the new constructed two-layer network has the same
min-cut capacity MA of the corresponding separable network.
In what follows, we refer to the original separable network
as parent separable network, and to the corresponding two-
layer network as child two-layer network. We now show that
a secure scheme designed for the child two-layer network can
be converted to a secure scheme for the corresponding parent
separable network. Towards this end, we assume that we have
a secure scheme for the child two-layer network as described
in (2), and proceed as follows. On every graph G′J in the
parent separable network, we transmit (multicast) the symbols
that were transmitted in the child two-layer network from the
source S in layer 0 to the set of M ′J relays in layer 1 that were
added when constructing the child two-layer network for G′J .
Note that this multicast towards all destinations Di, i ∈ J ,
is possible since G′J has min-cut capacity M ′J . With such a
strategy, at the end of the transmissions every destination in the
parent separable graph still receives the same set of packets as
it would have received in the child two-layer network. Thus,
all the destinations can still decode their respective messages.
In Appendix C we also prove that this scheme satisfies the
security condition in [10, Lemma 3.1], and hence it is secure.
Moreover, since the child two-layer and the parent separable
networks have equal min-cut capacities, they have the same
outer bound on the secure capacity region [2]. Thus, an optimal
scheme on a child two-layer network results in an optimal
scheme on the corresponding parent separable network.
V. SECURE CAPACITY FOR k = 1
In this section, we consider the case when Eve wiretaps any
k = 1 edge of her choice, and characterize the secure capacity
region. In particular, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the two-layer network when Eve wiretaps
any k = 1 edge of her choice, the secure capacity region is∑
i∈ARi ≤MA − CA, ∀A ⊆ [m], (5)
with CA being the number of connected components in an
undirected graph where: (i) there are |A| nodes, i.e., one for
each i ∈ A; (ii) an edge between node i and node j, {i, j} ∈
A, i 6= j, exists if Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅.
Outer Bound: The secure capacity region [2] is contained in:∑
i∈ARi ≤MA − k, ∀A ⊆ [m]. (6)
We now show that the outer bound in (6) can be equivalently
written as in (5). Let Vi, i ∈ [CA], represent the set of nodes
in the i-th component of the graph constructed as explained
in Theorem 2. Then, clearly A = ⊔CAi=1 Vi and we can write∑
i∈ARi =
∑CA
j=1
(∑
i∈Vj Ri
) (a)
≤ ∑CAj=1 (MVj − k)
(b)
= MV1∪V2∪...∪VCA−kCA
(c)
= MA − CA,
where: (i) the inequality in (a) follows by applying (6) for
each set Vi, i ∈ [CA], (ii) the equality in (b) follows since, by
construction, Mi ∩Mj = ∅ for all i ∈ Vx and j ∈ Vy with
x 6= y, and (iii) the equality in (c) follows since A = ⊔CAi=1 Vi
and k = 1. Thus, (6) implies (5). Moreover, since CA ≥ 1, (5)
implies (6). This shows that the rate region in Theorem 2 is
an outer bound on the secure capacity region when k = 1.
We now consider an example of a two-layer network and
show how the upper bound derived above applies to it.
Example: Let A = {2, 3, 4}, and assume that M1 = {1, 2},
M2 = {3, 4}, M3 = {4, 5, 6} and M4 = {7, 8}. Then, we
construct an undirected graph such that: (i) it has 3 nodes since
|A| = 3 and (ii) has an edge between node 2 and node 3 since
M2 ∩M3 = {4} 6= ∅. It therefore follows that this graph has
CA = 2 components. In particular, we have∑
i∈ARi =
∑
i∈V1Ri +
∑
i∈V2Ri ≤M{2,3,4} − 2 = 4, (7)
where V1 = {2, 3} and V2 = {4}.
Achievable Rate Region: We here show that the rate region in
Theorem 2 is achieved by the scheme described in Section III.
In particular, we show
MA − CA ≤ dim
(∑
i∈ANi
) (a)
= dim
(
(∩i∈AVi)⊥
)
= t− dim (∩i∈AVi) ,
where recall that dim
(∑
i∈ANi
)
is the secure rate perfor-
mance of our proposed scheme in Section III (see Lemma 1).
Note that the equality in (a) follows by using the property of
the dual space and the rank nullity theorem, and Vi, i ∈ A is
defined in (3). In other words, we next show that
∀A ⊆ [m], dim (∩i∈AVi) ≤ t−MA + CA. (8)
Towards this end, we would like to count the number of
linearly independent vectors x ∈ Ftq that belong to (∩i∈AVi).
We note that, by our construction: (i) V T consists of one
row of t ones, and (ii) Ci has zeros in the positions indexed by
Mi. Hence, if a vector belongs to Vi, then all its components
indexed by Mi have to be the same, i.e., either they are all
zeros, or they are all equal to a multiple of one. Thus, we have
q choices to fill these positions indexed by Mi.
Now, consider Vj with j ∈ A and j 6= i. By using the
same logic as above, if a vector belongs to Vj , then all its
components indexed byMj have to be the same and we have
q choices to fill these. We now need to count the number of
such choices that are consistent with the choices made to fill
the positions indexed by Mi.
Towards this end, we consider two cases:
• Case 1: Mi ∩Mj = ∅. In this case, there is no overlap
in the elements indexed by Mi and Mj and hence we can
select all the available q choices for the positions indexed by
Mj ;
• Case 2:Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅. There is an overlap in the elements
indexed by Mi and Mj . Since we have already fixed the
elements indexed by Mi, there is no choice for the elements
indexed by Mj (as all the elements have to be the same).
By iterating the same reasoning as above for all i ∈ A, we
conclude that we can fill all the positions indexed by ∪i∈AMi
of a vector x ∈ Ftq and make sure that x ∈ (∩i∈AVi) in qCA
ways. This is because, there are CA connected components,
and for each of these components we have only q choices
to fill the corresponding positions in the vector x (i.e., the
positions that correspond to the relays to which at least
one of the destinations inside that component is connected).
Once we fix any position inside a component, in fact all the
other positions inside that component have to be the same,
and thus we have no more freedom in choosing the other
positions. Moreover, the remaining t−MA positions of x can
be filled with any value in Fq and for this we have qt−MA
possible choices. Therefore, the number of vectors x ∈ Ftq
that belong to (∩i∈AVi) is at most qCA+t−MA , which implies
∀A ⊆ [m], dim (∩i∈AVi) ≤ t − MA + CA. This proves
that the secure scheme in Section III achieves the rate region
in Theorem 2. We now illustrate our method of identifying
vectors that belong to ∩i∈AVi through an example.
Example: Let t = 8, m = 4, M1 = {1, 2}, M2 = {3, 4},
M3 = {4, 5, 6} and M4 = {7, 8}. Let A = {2, 3, 4}.
We want to count the number of vectors x ∈ F8q such that
x ∈ V2 ∩ V3 ∩ V4. We use the following iterative procedure:
• For x to belong to V2 its elements in the 3rd and 4th positions
have to be the same since M2 = {3, 4}. Thus, we have q
choices to fill the 3rd and 4th positions.
• For x to belong to V3, its elements in the 4th, 5th and 6th
positions have to be equal sinceM3 = {4, 5, 6}. However, the
element in the 4th position has already been fixed in selecting
vectors that belong to V2. Thus, there is no further choice in
filling the 5th and 6th position.
• For x to belong to V4, its elements in the 7th and 8th
positions have to be the same since M4 = {7, 8}. Since in
the previous two steps, we have not filled yet the elements
in these positions, then we have q possible ways to fill the
elements in the 7th and 8th positions.
• Moreover, we can fill the elements in the 1st and 2nd
positions of x in q2 possible ways.
With the above procedure we get that dim
(∩i∈{2,3,4}Vi) = 4,
which is equal to the upper bound that we computed in (7)
for the same example.
VI. SECURE CAPACITY FOR m = 3
In this section, we consider the case m = 3, and we charac-
terize the secure capacity region through the theorem below.
Theorem 3. For a two-layer network with m = 3 destinations,
the secure capacity region is given by∑
i∈ARi ≤MA − k, ∀A ⊆ [m]. (9)
Clearly the rate region in (9) is an outer bound on the secure
capacity region [2] and can be equivalently written as∑
i∈ARi ≤ minP : ⊔
Q∈P
Q=A
{∑
Q∈P
MQ − |P|k
}
, ∀A ⊆ [m],
where P is a partition of A. We will show that ∀A ⊆ [m],
dim
(∑
i∈ANi
)≥ min
P : ⊔
Q∈P
Q=A
{∑
Q∈P
MQ − |P|k
}
. (10)
We prove (10) by considering three different cases.
Case 1: |A| = 1, i.e., A = {i}. For this case, Vi in (3) has
k + t −M{i} rows. All these rows are linearly independent
since: (i) the rows of V T are linearly independent as V is a
Vandermonde matrix, (ii) Ci is full row rank by construction,
and (iii) any linear combination of the rows of V T will have a
weight of at least t−k+ 1 (from the Vandermonde property),
whereas any linear combination of the rows of Ci will have a
weight of at most t−M{i} ≤ t− k. It therefore follows that,
∀i ∈ [3], we have that dim(Ni) = t− dim(Vi) = t− (k+ t−
M{i}) = M{i} − k, where the first equality follows by using
the rank-nullity theorem. Thus, (10) is satisfied.
Case 2: |A| = 2, i.e., A = {i, j}. ∀(i, j) ∈ [3]2, i 6= j,
dim(Ni +Nj) = dim(Ni) + dim(Nj)− dim(Ni ∩Nj)
= M{i}+M{j}−2k−dim(Ni ∩Nj), (11)
where the second equality follows by using dim(Ni) derived
in Case 1. Thus, we need to compute dim(Ni∩Nj). Note that,
by definition, Ni ∩Nj is the right null space of
V ?ij =
[
Vi
Vj
]
(3)
=
V TCi
Cj
 = [V T
Cij
]
,
where in the last equality, Cij is a matrix of dimension (t −
M∩{i,j})× t, with all unique rows. Using a similar argument
as in Case 1 the number of linearly independent rows of V ?ij
is min{t, t−M∩{i,j} + k}. Thus,
dim(Ni ∩Nj) = t−min{t, t−M∩{i,j} + k}
= max{0,M∩{i,j} − k} = [M∩{i,j} − k]+,
where the first equality follows from the rank-nullity the-
orem. We can now write dim(Ni + Nj) from (11) as
dim(Ni +Nj) = min
{
M{i} +M{i} − 2k,M{i,j} − k
}
, and
the condition in (10) is satisfied.
Case 3: A = {1, 2, 3}. We will compute
dim(N1 +N2 +N3) = t− dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3), (12)
that is, the number of linearly independent vectors x ∈ Ftq
that belong to V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3. Similar to the case k = 1, we
have t−M{1,2,3} degrees of freedom to fill the positions of x
corresponding to [t] \∪i∈[3]Mi. We now select a permutation
(i, j, `) of (1, 2, 3). In order for x to belong to Vi, the positions
of x corresponding to Mi can be filled with k degrees of
freedom. This is because: (i) Ci in (3) has zeros in the
positions specified by Mi, and (ii) V T has k rows. Then, to
fill the positions of x specified byMj so that x ∈ Vj , we have
at most [k −M∩{i,j}]+ degrees of freedom. This is because
the positions of x corresponding to Mi ∩ Mj are already
fixed. Finally, to fill the positions of x corresponding to M`
so that x ∈ V`, we have at most [k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]+ degrees
of freedom. This is because the positions of x corresponding
to M` ∩ (Mi ∪ Mj) are already fixed. Thus, we obtain
dim(V1∩V2∩V3) ≤ k+[k −M∩{i,j}]++[k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]++
t−M{1,2,3}, which when substituted in (12), satisfies (10) (see
Appendix B). This proves Theorem 3.
We now conclude this section with the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The scheme in Section III achieves the secure
capacity region of a two-layer network with arbitrary values
of k and m wheneverM∩{i,j} ≥ k for all (i, j) ∈ [m]2, i 6= j.
Proof. We can compute dim(∩mi=1Vi) as follows:
dim(∩i∈AVi)
(a)
≤ t−MA + k + [k −M∩{i1,i2}]+
+
∑m
j=3 [k −M∩{ij ,{i1,i2,...,ij−1}}]+
(b)
≤k + t−MA,
where: (a) follows by extending to arbitrary m the iterative
algorithm for Case 3 above to select x ∈ ∩mi=1Vm, and (b)
follows since M∩{ij ,{i1,i2,...,ij−1}} ≥ M∩{ij ,ij−1} ≥ k. By
using the property of the dual space and the rank-nullity
theorem, we obtain dim(
∑
i∈ANi) ≥ MA − k, which
satisfies (10) ∀A ⊆ [m]. This proves Lemma 4.
REFERENCES
[1] G. K. Agarwal, M. Cardone, and C. Fragouli, “On secure network coding
for multiple unicast traffic,” arXiv:1901.02787, January 2019.
[2] ——, “Secure network coding for multiple unicast: On the case of single
source,” in Information Theoretic Security, 2017, pp. 188–207.
[3] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Labs
Technical Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[4] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” The Bell System Technical
Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[5] U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742, 1993.
[6] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung, “Secure network coding,” in IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory, 2002, pp. 323–.
[7] J. Feldman, T. Malkin, C. Stein, and R. Servedio, “On the capacity
of secure network coding,” in 42nd Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2004, pp. 63–68.
[8] S. Y. El Rouayheb and E. Soljanin, “On wiretap networks II,” in IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory, 2007, pp. 551–555.
[9] N. Cai and M. Hayashi, “Secure network code for adaptive and active
attacks with no-randomness in intermediate nodes,” arXiv:1712.09035.
[10] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung, “A security condition for multi-source linear
network coding,” in 2007 IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory, June 2007, pp. 561–565.
[11] A. Schrijver, Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, vol. B.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We let T be a matrix of dimension (
∑m
i=1Ri)× t that, for
each destination Di, i ∈ [m], contains Ri decoding vectors
that belong to Ni. Mathematically, we have
T =

−−−− d(1)1 −−−−
−−−− d(1)2 −−−−
...
−−−− d(1)R1 −−−−
−−−− d(2)1 −−−−
...
−−−− d(m)Rm −−−−

, (13)
where d(i)j denotes the j-th decoding vector (of length t)
selected from the null space Ni, with i ∈ [m], j ∈ [Ri]. Note
that, if for all i ∈ [m], we can select Ri decoding vectors
from Ni such that all the d
(i)
j in (13) are linearly independent
(i.e., such that T has a full row rank), then it is possible to
construct the matrix M in (2) such that
TM = I,
which ensures that all the destinations are able to correctly
decode their intended message as Wˆ1...
Wˆm
 = T
X1...
Xt
 (2)= [TM TV ]

W1
...
Wm
K

= TM
W1...
Wm
+ TV K =
W1...
Wm
 .
We propose an iterative algorithm to select Ri, i ∈ [m]
decoding vectors from Ni such that T in (13) has indeed a
full row rank. The performance of the proposed algorithm is
provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any given permutation pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(m)}
of [m], it is possible to select
Rpi(i) = dim
 i∑
j=1
Npi(j)
− dim
i−1∑
j=1
Npi(j)
 , i ∈ [m],
(14)
vectors from Npi(i) so that all the
∑m
i=1Ri selected vectors
are linearly independent.
Proof. We use an iterative algorithm that, for any permutation
pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(m)} of [m], allows to select Rpi(i) vectors
from Npi(i) (with Rpi(i) being defined in (14)) so that all the
selected
∑m
i=1Ri vectors are linearly independent. We next
illustrate the main steps of the proposed algorithm.
1) We select Rpi(1) = dim(Npi(1)) independent vectors
from Npi(1). Note that one possible choice for this
consists of selecting the basis of the subspace Npi(1).
2) Next we would like to select independent vectors from
Npi(2) that are also independent of the Rpi(1) vectors
that we selected in the previous step. Towards this end,
we note that a basis of the subspace Npi(1) +Npi(2) is a
subset of the union between a basis of Npi(1) and a basis
of Npi(2). Therefore, we can keep selecting vectors from
a basis of Npi(2) as long as we select an independent
vector. Since there are dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2)) independent
vectors in a basis of Npi(1) +Npi(2), then we can select
Rpi(2) = dim(Npi(1) +Npi(2))− dim(Npi(1))
independent vectors from Npi(2) that are also indepen-
dent of the Rpi(1) vectors that we selected in the previous
step.
3) Similar to the above step, we now would like to select
independent vectors from Npi(3) that are also indepen-
dent of the Rpi(1) + Rpi(2) vectors that we selected in
the previous two steps. Towards this end, we note that a
basis of the subspace Npi(1)+Npi(2)+Npi(3) is a subset of
the union between a basis of Npi(1) +Npi(2) and a basis
of Npi(3). Therefore, we can keep selecting vectors from
a basis of Npi(3) as long as we select an independent
vector. Since there are dim(Npi(1) + Npi(2) + Npi(3))
independent vectors in a basis of Npi(1)+Npi(2)+Npi(3),
then we can select
Rpi(3)=dim(Npi(1)+Npi(2)+Npi(3))−dim(Npi(1)+Npi(2))
independent vectors from Npi(3) that are also indepen-
dent of the Rpi(1)+Rpi(2) vectors that we selected in the
previous two steps.
4) We keep using the iterative procedure above for all the
elements in pi, and we end up with
∑m
i=1Ri vectors that
are linearly independent.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.
Remark 3. Note that, since there are m! possible permuta-
tions of [m], then Lemma 5 offers m! possible choices for
selecting Ri, i ∈ [m] vectors from Ni so that all the
∑m
i=1Ri
selected vectors are linearly independent.
Remark 4. The result in Lemma 5 implies that rate m-tuple
(R1, R2, . . . , Rm), with Ri, i ∈ [m] being defined in (14), can
be securely achieved by our proposed scheme.
We now leverage the result in Lemma 5 to prove Lemma 1.
We start by noting that the rate region in (4) can be expressed
as the following polyhedron:
Pf :=
{
R ∈ R[m] : R ≥ 0,
∑
i∈A
Ri ≤ f(A), ∀ A ⊆ [m]
}
,
(15)
where f(A) := dim (∑i∈ANi). We now prove the following
lemma, which states that this function f(·) is a non-decreasing
and submodular function over subsets of [m].
Lemma 6. The set function
f(A) := dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
, ∀A ⊆ [m]
is a non-decreasing and submodular function.
Proof. Let A ⊂ B ⊆ [m], then
f(B) = dim
(∑
i∈B
Ni
)
= dim
∑
i∈A
Ni +
∑
j∈B\A
Nj

≥ dim
(∑
i∈A
Ni
)
= f(A),
which proves that the function f(·) is non-decreasing. For
proving submodularity, consider two subsets C,D ⊆ [m].
Then, we have
f(C ∪ D) = dim
( ∑
i∈C∪D
Ni
)
= dim
∑
i∈C
Ni +
∑
j∈D
Nj

= dim
(∑
i∈C
Ni
)
+ dim
∑
j∈D
Nj

− dim
(∑
i∈C
Ni
)
∩
∑
j∈D
Nj

≤ dim
(∑
i∈C
Ni
)
+ dim
∑
j∈D
Nj

− dim
( ∑
k∈C∩D
Nk
)
= f(C) + f(D)− f(C ∩ D),
which proves that the function f(·) is submodular.
Since f(·) is a submodular function, then the polyhedron
defined in (15) is the polymatroid associated with f(·). More-
over, since f(·) is also non-decreasing, then the corner points
of the polymatroid in (15) can be found as follows [11, Corol-
lary 44.3a]. Consider a permutation pi = {pi(1), . . . , pi(m)} of
[m]. Then, by letting S` = {pi(1), . . . , pi(`)} for 1 ≤ ` ≤ m,
we get that the corner points of the polymatroid in (15) can
be written as
Rpi(`) = f(S`)− f(S`−1).
Note that by using f(A) = dim (∑i∈ANi), the above corner
points are precisely those in (14) in Lemma 5. Since each rate
m-tuple (R1, R2, . . . , Rm), with Ri, i ∈ [m] being defined
in (14), can be securely achieved by our proposed scheme, it
follows that the secure rate region in (4) can also be achieved
by our scheme. This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B
ANALYSIS OF THE DIMENSION OF (V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3)
From our analysis, we have obtained
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ k + [k −M∩{i,j}]+
+ [k −M∩{`,{i,j}}]+
+ t−M{1,2,3}. (16)
We now further consider two cases.
Case 3A: There exist (i, j) ∈ [3]2, i 6= j, such that M∩{i,j} ≥
k. In this case, with the permutation (i, j, `), the expression
in (16) becomes
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) ≤ K+[K −M∩{`,{i,j}}]++t−M{1,2,3}
= t−M{1,2,3} + max{2k −M∩{`,{i,j}}, k}.
From (12), this implies that
dim(N1 +N2 +N3)
≥M{1,2,3} −max{2k −M∩{`,{i,j}}, k}
= min
{
M{1,2,3} − k,M{`} +M{i,j} − 2k
}
,
where the last equality follows since M{1,2,3} = M{i,j} +
M{`}−M∩{`,{i,j}}. With this, the condition in (10) is satisfied.
Case 3B: We have M∩{i,j} < K, ∀(i, j) ∈ [3]2, i 6= j. In this
case, we compute dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3) as follows: we first fill
the positions of x indexed byM1 with k degrees of freedom,
and then fill the positions of x indexed by M2 with (k −
M∩{1,2}) degrees of freedom as before. Now, we may have
fixed more than k positions of x corresponding to indexes in
M3, which is not feasible. If that is the case, we backtrack
(i.e., remove excess degrees of freedom) that we have used
for filling positions of x indexed by M2. Thus,
1) If M∩{3,{1,2}} ≤ k, then
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3)
≤t−M{1,2,3} + k + (k −M∩{1,2}})
+ (k −M∩{3,{1,2}}).
This, from (12), implies
dim(N1 +N2 +N3) ≥M{1} +M{2} +M{3} − 3k,
which satisfies the condition in (10).
2) If M∩{3,{1,2}} > k, then
dim(V1 ∩ V2 ∩ V3)
≤t−M{1,2,3} + k + (k −M∩{1,2})−
min{(k −M∩{1,2}), (M∩{3,{1,2}} − k)}.
This, from (12), implies
dim(N1 +N2 +N3)
≥min{M{1,2,3} − k,M{1} +M{2} +M{3} − 3k} ,
which satisfies the condition in (10).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF SECURITY: SEPARABLE NETWORKS
In this section we will show that the scheme described for
any separable network is also secure. Towards this end, we
start by noting that the only property of V that we have used in
our scheme for two-layer networks is the Maximum Distance
Separable (MDS) property (i.e., any k rows of V are linearly
independent). This implies that, even if in (2) we select a
random matrix V˜ instead of V , with high probability (close
to 1 for large field size) we will have a secure scheme for the
child two-layer network.
Let Y be the collection of the symbols transmitted (mul-
ticast) on the parent separable network, as described above.
Since multicasting involves network coding, we have
Y =
[
G
]
X, (17)
where G is an encoding matrix of dimension |E|×M[m] Thus,
Y =
[
G
] [
M V˜
] [ W
K
]
=
[
GM GV˜
] [ W
K
]
.
From the security condition in [10, Lemma 3.1], it follows
that the scheme above is secure if we can show that for any
choice of G, there exists a V˜ such that V˜ is an MDS matrix
(i.e., any k rows of V˜ are linearly independent) and
rk
([
GM GV˜
]∣∣
Z
)
= rk
([
GV˜
]∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k.
We will show that for any choice of G of size |E| ×M[m]
with M[m] ≥ k, there exists a V˜ such that V˜ is an MDS matrix
(i.e., any k rows of V˜ are linearly independent) and
rk
([
GM GV˜
]∣∣
Z
)
= rk
([
GV˜
]∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k.
(18)
We start by noting that
rk
([
GV˜
]∣∣
Z
)
= rk
(
G|Z · V˜
)
≤ rk
([
GM GV˜
]∣∣
Z
)
= rk
(
G|Z ·
[
M V˜
]) ≤ rk (G|Z) .
Thus, if we prove that, for all |Z| ≤ k,
rk
(
G|Z · V˜
)
= rk (G|Z) , (19)
then we also show that (18) holds. In what follows, we
formally prove that a V˜ such that V˜ is an MDS matrix
that satisfies the condition in (19) for all |Z| ≤ k can be
constructed with a non-zero probability. Towards this end, we
let kˆ = rk (G|Z), where kˆ ≤ k since |Z| ≤ k. We define the
event
A =
{
rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}
.
We have
Pr
{
A ∩
{
V˜ is MDS
}}
(a)
= 1− Pr
{
Ac ∪
{
V˜ is not MDS
}}
(b)
≥ 1− Pr {Ac}︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
−Pr
{
V˜ is not MDS
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
,
where: (i) the equality in (a) follows by using the De Morgan’s
laws, and (ii) the inequality in (b) follows since for two events
A and B, we have Pr(A ∪ B) ≤ Pr(A) + Pr(B). We now
further upper bound the two probability terms P1 and P2. For
P1, we obtain
P1 = Pr
{
rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z
)
, ∀|Z| ≤ k
}c
(c)
= Pr

 ⋂
Z:|Z|≤k
AZ
c
(d)
= Pr
 ⋃Z:|Z|≤k(AZ)c

(e)
≤
∑
Z:|Z|≤k
Pr {(AZ)c}
(f)
≤
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
Z:|Z|≤k
Pr {(AZ)c}
=
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
Z:|Z|≤k
(1− Pr {AZ})
(g)
≤
(
e|E|
k
)k
max
Z:|Z|≤k
(
1− Pr
{
AˆZ
})
(h)
=
(
e|E|
k
)k1− kˆ−1∏
i=0
(
1− q
i
qkˆ
)
(i)
≤
(
e|E|
k
)k(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
,
where: (i) the equality in (c) follows by defining, for a given
Z such that |Z| ≤ k, the event
AZ =
{
rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z V˜
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z
)}
,
(ii) the equality in (d) follows by using the De Morgan’s laws;
(iii) the inequality in (e) follows by using the union bound;
(iv) the inequality in (f) follows since
(
n
t
) ≤ ( ent )t; (v) the
inequality in (g) follows by defining the event AˆZ as
AˆZ =
{
rk
(
GˆVˆ
)
= rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z
)}
,
where Gˆ is the matrix formed by the kˆ = rk
([
G
]∣∣
Z
)
independent rows of
[
G
]∣∣
Z , and Vˆ is formed by the first kˆ
columns of V˜ . Thus, the inequality in (g) then follows since
AˆZ ⊆ AZ ; (vi) the equality in (h) follows due to the following
computation. We write
Vˆ =
[
v1 v2 . . . vkˆ
]
=⇒ GˆVˆ = [ Gˆv1 Gˆv2 . . . Gˆvkˆ ] .
Note that the matrix GˆVˆ is of full rank (equal to kˆ) if the
only solution to
∑kˆ
i=1 ciGˆvi = 0 is ci = 0,∀i ∈ [kˆ]. Let
Nˆ be the null space of Gˆ, and Nˆ⊥ be the space such that
Nˆ⊥ ∩ Nˆ = ∅ and Nˆ⊥ ∪ Nˆ = FM[m]q . Then, we can write
each vi, i ∈ [kˆ], as the sum of its projection on Nˆ (say v(a)i )
and the residual in Nˆ⊥ (say v(b)i ). This implies that GˆVˆ is
of full rank if the only solution to
∑kˆ
i=1 ciGˆv
(b)
i = 0 is ci =
0,∀i ∈ [kˆ] (because Gˆv(a)i = 0). Since a random choice of
vi results in a random choice on v
(b)
i , then the probability of
GˆVˆ being of full rank is equal to the probability that all the
vectors v(b)i , i ∈ [kˆ] are mutually independent in Nˆ⊥. This
probability, since dim(Nˆ⊥) = kˆ, is equal to
∏kˆ−1
i=0
(
1− qi
qkˆ
)
;
finally, (vii) the inequality in (i) follows since i− kˆ ≤ −1 for
all i ∈ [0 : kˆ − 1] and kˆ ≤ k.
For P2, we obtain
P2 = Pr
{
V˜ is not MDS
}
(j)
= Pr

 ⋂
S:|S|=k
As
c
(k)
= Pr
 ⋃S:|S|=k(AS)c

(`)
=
(
M[m]
k
)
Pr {(AS)c}
=
(
M[m]
k
)
(1− Pr {AS})
(m)
=
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
k−1∏
i=0
qk − qi
qk
)
(n)
≤
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
k−1∏
i=0
(
1− 1
q
))
=
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
,
where: (i) the equality in (j) follows by defining, for a given
S such that |S| = k, the event
AS =
{
V˜ |S is full rank
}
,
(ii) the equality in (k) follows by using the De Morgan’s
laws; (iii) the equality in (`) follows by selecting uniformly at
random all the subsets of k rows out of the M[m] rows, (iv) the
equality in (m) follows by counting arguments to ensure that
the k selected rows are all independent, and (v) the inequality
in (n) follows since i− k ≤ −1 for all i ∈ [0 : k − 1].
Thus, we obtain
Pr
{
A ∩
{
V˜ is MDS
}}
≥ 1−
(
e|E|
k
)k(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
−
(
M[m]
k
)(
1−
(
1− 1
q
)k)
> 0,
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently large Fq .
